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held that futures trading was hedging and not speculation if
the commodity transactions were an integral part of the
taxpayer’s business and the taxpayer acquired the actuals in
the course of business.13  Thus, “pre-hedging” is permitted
(before a crop is planted and before feeder animals are
acquired) but “post-hedging” which involves attempts to
hedge after the commodity is sold is not a hedge but is
speculation.14
“Direct relation” test.  Under the direct relation test, there
must be a reasonable quantitative relationship between the
taxpayer’s involvement with the actuals and the commodity
market transaction if the transaction is considered to be a
hedge. 15  For the direct relation test to be met, the amount of
futures trading in the particular commodity involved and the
timing of purchases and sales must be related to the position
of the taxpayer in the actuals.16
Wrong entity hedging
A problem that is becoming increasingly common with
multiple-entity business plans, with the overall farming or
ranching operation divided between or among entities, is in
having the hedging transactions carried on by the correct
entity.  In Pine Creek Farms, Ltd. v. Comm’r,17 a corn,
soybean, cattle and hog operation was divided among
several entities.  The taxpayer, a C corporation, was engaged
in producing corn, soybeans and cattle; the hog operation
was handled by two other corporations, one for farrowing
and one for finishing.  The taxpayer corporation in the tax
year in question had $40,934 of hedging losses of which
$6,305 was from hog hedges.18  IRS determined the $6,305
was a capital loss for the taxpayer and the Tax Court
agreed.19  IRS argued that the taxpayer was not engaged in
the hog business and could not have hedging transactions in
hogs.  It didn’t matter that a shareholder of the taxpayer C
corporation was engaged in hog production through the other
two corporations.
A 1997 private letter ruling addressed a similar question.20  In
that ruling, a dairy farm was carried on by an S corporation
but a shareholder attempted to hedge feed supplies.  The S
corporation’s business was not attributed to the shareholder
for hedging purposes.
In conclusion
Among other points to watch, it is vital for hedging status
that the hedging transactions be carried on by the correct
entity.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
CRIMINAL NEGLECT.  The defendant operated for
several years a boarding house for the defendant’s and
other’s horses. The defendant was convicted of two counts
of violating Iowa Code § 717.2(2) for failing to properly
feed two horses. The case does not disclose any reasons for
the lack of care. The two dead horses were discovered by a
sheriff’s deputy at the edge of a field, observable from a
road. The deputy took several photographs from a
neighboring property and obtained a search warrant to have
a veterinarian examine the horses for cause of death. The
defendant claimed that the horses died in a storm; however,
the expert witnesses testified that the horses died from
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starvation. The defendant challenged the jury verdict of
guilty on both counts on two issues: (1) that the statute
provided for only one violation involving one period of
neglect and (2) there was no probable cause to support the
search warrant. On the first issue the court agreed that the
statute limited to one the number of offenses with which a
defendant could be charge for any uninterrupted period of
neglect. Since the two horses died together, the court held
that the defendant could be charged with only one violation.
On the second issue, the court held that sufficient probable
cause for the warrant was provided by the deputy’s personal
experience with observing animals which had died from
starvation and were under the defendant’s care. S ate v.
Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 2001).
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
ADDITIONAL CHILD TAX CREDIT. The debtor
claimed an exemption for an income tax refund. The
exemption was claimed under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 205.220(3)
for benefits received under federal, state or local public
assistance legislation. The debtor claimed that the refund
resulted from the additional child income tax credit allowed
under I.R.C. § 24(d). The court applied a three part inquiry
as to whether the tax credit was in the nature of public
assistance: whether the credit had a public assistance
purpose, whether the credit was refundable, and at what
income level did the credit phase out. The court held that the
additional child credit had the public assistance purpose to
help families with three or more children and was
refundable. However, the court held that the credit was not
eligible for the exemption because the credit was available to
higher income families, thus demonstrating that the credit
was not intended to serve as public assistance legislation. In
re Beltz, 263 B.R. 525 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . The debtor owned a
dairy farm which was operated by the debtor’s son. The son
often made personal payments for dairy expenses which
were reimbursed by the debtor. The son made a $12,000
payment on an insurance premium for the debtor and, as
usual, the debtor reimbursed the son for that expense. That
reimbursement, however, was made within 90 days before
the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 and the trustee sought to recover the
$12,000 reimbursement as a preferential transfer. The son
argued that the son was not a creditor and the reimbursement
was not for an antecedent debt.  The court held that the son’s
payment of the debtor’s insurance obligation created a debt
prior to the reimbursement for that payment; therefore, the
reimbursement was a preferential transfer and the son was
required to return the reimbursement to the bankruptcy
estate. The case gives no indication why the son did not raise
the issue of the exception in Section 547(c) for payments
made in the ordinary course of business for normal business
xpenses. In re Mowry, 263 B.R. 499 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2001).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and
received a discharge. After the discharge, the IRS audited
th  1987 tax return of a corporation owned by the debtor and
terminated in 1988. The IRS determined that the corporation
owed taxes for 1987 and that the debtor was personally
responsible for those taxes because the corporation made
distributions of property to the debtor in 1987. The debtor
argued that the debtor’s transferee liability for the
corporation’s taxes was not a tax; therefore, the liability was
discharged in the Chapter 7 case. The court held that I.R.C. §
6901(a) provided for collection of transferee liability in the
same manner as collection of a tax liability; therefore, the
debtor’s transferee liability was in the nature of a tax and
was not discharged in the Chapter 7 case. In re McKowen,
263 B.R. 618 (D. Colo. 2001).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS . The debtor was a
general partnership. The general partner had fraudulently
claimed income for the partnership from fake sales
transactions. The partnership paid the income tax liability of
its partners at the direction of the general partner, based on
the inflated partnership income. When the limited partner
learned that the income was falsely inflated, the limited
partner had the partnership file amended returns which
resulted in refunds to the limited partner. The trustee sought
to recover from the IRS the excess tax payments made by
the partnership to the IRS. The IRS argued that it was not an
“initial transferee” of the tax payment because it did not
exercise dominion and control over the funds since it was
required to refund the money to the limited partner. The
court held that the IRS did exercise some control over the
taxes because it did not refund the entire amount to the
limited partner. The IRS also argued that the partners were
the initial transferees because the tax payments were made
on their behalf by the debtor. The court held that an issue of
fact remained as to whether the limited partner participated
in the initial payment of taxes by the partnership for the
partners, in which case, (1) the IRS was not the initial
transferee of the limited partner’s taxes and (2) the IRS was
an immediate or mediate transferee. The court did not decide
the remaining issue of whether the IRS, as an immediate or
mediate transferee, received the transfer of funds for value,
and in good faith, without knowledge of the voidability (if
appropriate) of the transfer, in which case the taxes could not
be recovered from the IRS. In re C.F. Foods, L.P., 2001-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,599 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT.  The defendant operated a dairy
farm. Animal waste from the farm was stored in holding
ponds, sprayed onto fields  and stored on the defendant’s
l nd. The plaintiffs were owners of land which was
downstream from the defendant’s dairy farm. The plaintiffs
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alleged two types of pollution of a stream governed by the
Clean Water Act (CWA). The first type of alleged pollution
was surface runoff of animal wastes into surface streams and
canals which fed into the CWA-governed stream. The
second type alleged that animal wastes seeped through the
soil into underground water which percolated into streams
which fed the CWA-governed stream. The defendant
initially challenged the standing of the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs alleged that the pollution runoff prevented them
from using their ponds for canoeing, fishing and swimming.
The court held that the plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury for
standing to bring the CWA suit. The court also held that
standing was supported by the allegations and supporting
affidavits demonstrating the causal connection between the
animal waste disposal activities of the defendant and the
resulting injury to the streams and ponds near the plaintiffs’
land. The defendant had obtained an NPDES permit and
argued that the permit negated any violation of the CWA and
the CWA pollution issues were moot. The court held,
however, that, because the plaintiffs filed affidavits that the
permit limit was being violated, the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged a continuing violation of the CWA. The
defendant also argued that the waters alleged to be polluted
by the animal waste runoff were not “waters of the United
States” governed by the CWA. The court held that, because
the plaintiffs alleged that the pollution reached a stream
which qualified as a “water of the United States,” the
pollution of tributaries and feeder streams was governed by
the CWA, even though the tributaries and feeder streams
were not “waters of the United States.” The more difficult
question involved whether pollution that first entered the
groundwater before reaching CWA-governed waters was
also covered under the CWA. The court acknowledged the
split of authority on this issue and held that the CWA
governed pollution which first enters groundwater before
affecting CWA-governed waters. The court noted that the
plaintiff still had to prove that the defendant’s animal wastes
which were absorbed into the soil did affect CWA-governed
waters. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F. Supp.2d
1169 (D. Idaho 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations amending the brucellosis regulations to change
the classification of Oklahoma from Class A to Class Free.
66 Fed. Reg. 45749 (Aug 30, 2001).
DISASTER ASSISTANCE. The CCC has announced the
revised eligibility requirements for benefits under the 1998
Crop Loss Disaster Assistance Program multi-year
provision. All interested parties must file applications prior
to close of business on September 14, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg.
45276 (Aug. 28, 2001).
FARM LOANS . The FSA has announced the end of a
temporary suspension, effective August 23, 2001, of direct
and guaranteed farm ownership and farm operating loan
financing for the construction of specialized facilities used
for the production of hogs. 66 Fed. Reg. 44330 (Aug. 23,
2001).
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE . The plaintiffs
were farmers who sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the President, the Secretary of Agriculture and the
Secretary of the Treasury. The plaintiffs sought, in essence,
an order requiring the defendants and their agents to
maintain market conditions favorable to small farmers.
Although the court acknowledged that the small farmer of
America continues to face tough economic conditions, the
court held that the suit involved only nonjusticiable political
questions and dismissed the suit. Schroder v. Bush, No. 00-
1357 (10th Cir. 2001), aff’g, sub nom, Schroder v. Clinton,
No. 00-CV-154-K (D. Colo. July 6, 2000).
SCRAPIE . The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
which restrict the interstate movement of sheep and goats
from states that do not follow effective flock management
practices for scrapie. The regulation amendments also
r quire animal identification for sheep and goats moving
int rstat  and reinstate a scrapie indemnity program to
comp nsate owners of certain animals destroyed due to
scrapie. 66 Fed. Reg. 43963 (Aug. 21, 2001).
WETLANDS . The plaintiff had received permission to
repair drainage tile on a tract of land. The drainage tile was
part of a drainage tile system which extended onto a
neighboring parcel also owned by the plaintiff. The USDA,
however, charged the plaintiff with conversion of wetlands
on the neighboring parcel. Apparently the plaintiff’s repair
of the drainage tile either affected the neighboring parcel or
the plaintiff repaired more tile than was allowed under the
permit. The plaintiff received a final lower administrative
ruling which ruled that the plaintiff had improperly
converted the wetlands on the neighboring parcel and gave
the plaintiff 30 days to appeal that decision. The plaintiff
alleged that an appeal was timely mailed to the National
Appeals Division (NAD). The NAD denied an appeal
because it asserted that no appeal was received by the NAD.
The plaintiff argued that the appeal papers must have been
lost in the mail or by the NAD and provided evidence of the
mailing. The NAD refused to consider the plaintiff’s
evidence of a mailing as “extenuating circumstances” and
held that the plaintiff had not demonstrated “good cause” for
acceptance of a late filed appeal. The court first ruled that
the denial of the appeal was reviewable by the court as a
final administrative decision. Next, the court held that the
NAD had used the incorrect standard in ruling that “good
cause” for the late appeal was not shown. The proper
standard was whether extenuating circumstances had been
shown for the late appeal. The court held that the NAD
denial of the appeal was improper in that the NAD failed to
consider the plaintiff’s evidence of a mailing as extenuating
circumstances. The court noted that the NAD had not
presented any evidence that the NAD staff did not lose the
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VALUATION. The decedent owned two ranches, one of
which was leased to one son and the other leased to another
son. Both leases were written and contained specific options
for renewal. Under the decedent’s will the two sons inherited
the two ranches in equal shares. The sons were appointed
executors of the estate and, as executors, executed five year
leases with five year renewal options. The estate claimed
that these leases were written versions of an oral extension
granted by the decedent before death and that the leases
decreased the value of the decedent’s interest in the ranches.
The IRS argued that no oral lease modification existed and
that any modification of the original leases had to be written
in order to be valid under Texas law. The court held that no
oral modification of the written lease existed and that the
written five year leases were ineffective to decrease the
value of the ranches in the estate. The court noted that the
leases were unnecessary in that the sons received the ranches




APPEALS. The taxpayer had filed a gift tax return and
paid tax. The taxpayer later filed an amended return which
showed no tax due but the IRS denied the claim for refund of
the gift tax paid. The taxpayer sought judicial review of the
IRS denial but the IRS decided to concede the issue and
moved to dismiss the case. The taxpayer sought attorney’s’
fees and court costs. The IRS argued that its concession of
the tax issue was a substantially justified position and, under
I.R.C. § 7430, no attorney fees could be awarded. The court
held that the focus of the Section 7430 inquiry could be at
two levels, the administrative appeal level and the judicial
review level. The court held that the IRS position at the
administrative appeal level was not substantially justified;
therefore, the attorneys’ fees at the judicial level were
allowed. Regimbal v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,583 (E.D. Wash. 2001).
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was employed as a
computer instructor/systems analyst for three employers.
The taxpayer claimed income and deductions related to the
employment on Schedule C. The taxpayer did not provide
any evidence of a business except for the filing of Schedule
C and had few records to support any of the expenses
claimed. The court held that the taxpayer was an employee
and did not operate a trade or business and that most of the
deductions were disallowed for lack of substantiation.
Humble v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-129.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02*.
STOCK REDEMPTIONS. The taxpayer wholly-owned
two corporations. The taxpayer became indebted to the first
corporation through direct distributions, corporate payment
of personal obligations and distributions which the taxpayer
contributed to the second corporation. The taxpayer’s
i debtedness to the first corporation was released in
exchang  for stock in the second corporation. The IRS
characterized the stock exchange as a stock redemption
subj ct to recognition of gain and loss under I.R.C. § 304.
The taxpayer argued that (1) Section 304 was not intended to
apply to this transaction and (2) an exception for stock
acquisition indebtedness applied in this case. The court held
that Section 304 did apply to the transaction because the
taxpayer retained control over both corporations and the
stock was exchanged for property, the release of
indebte ness. The court also held that the exception applied
only to the portion of the indebtedness to the first
corporation which was used to acquire an additional capital
interest in the second corporation. Because the remainder of
the debt was used for the taxpayer’s personal purposes, that
ebt was subject to Section 304 and had to be treated as a
stock red mption under I.R.C. §§ 301 or 302. The court held
that Section 302 did not apply because (1) the transfer was
essentially equivalent to a dividend, (2) the transfer did not
change the taxpayer’s control of the corporations, (3) the
transfer did not cause a termination of the corporations, and
(4) the transfer did not cause a partial termination of the
corporations. The court held that the transfer of stock in
exchange for the release of indebtedness, except for the
portion characterized as debt for acquisition of the second
corporation’s stock, was taxed as a dividend to the taxpayer.
Combrink v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. No. 8 (2001).
CAPITAL ASSETS . The taxpayer was a partnership
which owned and operated a ranch. When the ranch was
p rchased in 1976, it did not have any irrigation water rights
but the taxpayer expected that such rights could be acquired
because the land qualified for irrigation water. In 1983, the
taxpayer acquired irrigation water use rights under a state-
federal water use program for water from the lower
Colorado River. In 1993, the federal government purchased
these w ter use rights from the taxpayer and the issue was
whether the water use rights were capital assets or whether
the proceeds from the relinquishment of the rights were
ordinary income. The Tax Court held that the water use
rights were capital assets because (1) the water use rights
arose from the ownership of the land, (2) the water was used
in the business of the partnership but was not resold as a
commodity or otherwise used directly to produce ordinary
income for the taxpayer, and (3) the taxpayer had to
purchase water from another source. The IRS argued that no
sale or exchange occurred because the taxpayer’s receipt of
the funds was subject to reimbursement of the water
irrigation district in case the sale was revoked. The court
held that, although a reimbursement liability existed, the
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funds were transferred primarily as compensation for
relinquishment of the water use rights; therefore, a sale did
occur. The taxpayer argued that a portion of its tax basis in
the land could be allocated to the water use rights
relinquished. The court found that the original purchase
price of the ranch did not include any cost for water use
rights because the water use rights did not exist when the
ranch was purchased; therefore, the Tax Court held that no
tax basis of the land could be allocated to the water use
rights. On appeal, the appellate court reviewed only the third
holding that the taxpayer had no income tax basis in the
water rights from the purchase of the land. The appellate
court focused on the assertion that the price paid for the
ranch included a premium for the expected water rights;
therefore, that portion of the purchase price could be
allocated to the water rights when sold. The appellate court
cited Rev. Rul. 86-24, 1986-1 C.B. 80, which held that a
portion of the purchase price of impregnated cows could
allocated to the calves. The case was remanded to determine,
if possible, the premium paid for the land which could be
allocated to the water rights. The court noted that, under
Inaja Land Co., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 9 T.C. 727 (1947), if the
premium could not be determined, the taxpayer may be
allowed to allocate all of the ranch cost/basis to the water
rights.   Gladden v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,597 (9th Cir. 2001), rev’g and rem’g, 112 T.C. 209
(1999).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayers purchased rental real
estate and held the property for over 14 years. The taxpayers
made capital improvements to the property. The taxpayers
did not claim any depreciation deductions for the entire 14
years. The taxpayers sold the property and deducted from the
sale proceeds the property and water taxes owning against
the property. The taxpayers used their undepreciated basis to
determine that the sale of the property produced a loss. The
court held that the real estate taxes and water taxes were not
chargeable against the sale proceeds. In addition, the court
held that the taxpayers’ basis in the property had to be
decreased by the amount of depreciation deductions
allowable over the 14 years. Thus, the sale of the property
produced gain to the taxpayers. Jakubowski v. United
States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,594 (10th Cir.
2001), aff’g, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,604 (D.
Colo. 2000).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On August 15, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Tennessee were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
severe storms and flooding that began on July 27, 2001.
FEMA-1387-DR. On August 15, 2001, the President
determined that certain areas in Kentucky were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of severe storms and
flooding beginning on July 27, 2001. FEMA-1388-DR. On
August 16, 2001, the President determined that certain areas
in the District of Columbia were eligible for assistance under
the Act as a result of severe storms, flooding and mudslides
beginning on August 10, 2001. FEMA-1389-DR.
Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to
he disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 2000 federal
income tax return.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
purchased unemployment insurance for the taxpayer’s credit
cards. The insurance company made payments on the cards
during two year when the taxpayer was unemployed. The
taxpayer continued to make purchases with the cards and the
cards accrued interest during these two years. The court held
that the insurance payments were income to the taxpayer.
Huynh v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-131.
INCOME . The IRS has announced that it will revise the
2001 instructions for Form 1040 and Publication 17, to
inform Holocaust victims or their heirs about the income
exclusion provided by EGTRRA 2001 for restitution
payments currently being made by European governments
nd industries. Revisions also are planned for Publication
553, which will highlight tax law changes for 2001, and
Publication 525, which will define taxable and nontaxable
income. IR-2001-75.
INTEREST . The taxpayer, a corporation, timely filed
returns for several years. The returns were audited and a tax
deficiency plus interest was assessed. The taxpayer claimed
a deduction for the interest paid as a specified liability loss
under I.R.C. § 172(f). The court upheld this deduction. The
IRS argued that interest accrued within three years before
the tax year the interest deduction was claimed was
disallowed under I.R.C. § 172(f)(1)(B)(i). The IRS argued
th t the event which controlled the three year limit was the
accrual of the interest. The court disagreed, holding that the
defining event was the filing of the erroneous return;
therefore, because the returns were all filed more than three
years before the deduction was claimed, all the interest was
deductible. The appellate court affirmed in a decision
designated as not for publication. Host Marriott Corp. v.
United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,580 (4th
Cir. 2001), aff’g, 113 F. Supp.2d 790 (D. Md. 2000).
PENSON PLANS. For plans beginning in August 2001,
the weighted average is 5.79 percent with the permissible
range of 5.21 to 6.08 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible
range) and 5.21 to 6.37 percent (90 to 110 percent
permissible range) for purposes of determining the full
funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2001-
52, I.R.B. 2001-35, 203.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
TRUSTS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations which
incorp rate changes made to Code Sec. 1361 by the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-88, to
provide that a testamentary trust could be a permitted
shareholder of an S corporation for a two-year period. The
1996 mendments also provided that a former qualified
subpart E trust would be a permitted shareholder for a two-
year period whether or not the entire corpus was included in
the de med owner's gross estate. The proposed regulations
eliminate the special rules for determining whether trusts
consisting of community property qualify for the two-year
period. The proposed regulations refer to electing small
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business trusts (ESBTs), which were added by the 1996 Act,
and provide that certain former qualified subpart E trusts and
testamentary trusts could continue as permitted shareholders
after the end of the two-year period by becoming ESBTs.
The proposed regulations reflect law changes (1) allowing
certain exempt organizations to be S corporation
shareholders for post-1997 tax years and (2) increasing the
number of permissible S corporation shareholders from 35 to
75. The proposed regulations clarify that a current income
beneficiary of a testamentary trust that satisfies the QSST
requirements could make a QSST election at any time during
the two-year period in which the trust is a permitted
shareholder in the 16-day-and-two-month period beginning
on the date after the two-year period ends. Pursuant to this
provision, a testamentary trust would continue as a permitted
shareholder after the end of the two-year period by
becoming an electing QSST. Once the trust becomes an
electing QSST, the beneficiary would be treated as the
shareholder of the S corporation as of the effective date of
the QSST election. 66 Fed. Reg. 44565 (Aug. 24, 2001),
amending Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1.




AFR 3.82 3.78 3.76 3.75
110 percent AFR 4.20 4.16 4.14 4.12
120 percent AFR 4.59 4.54 4.51 4.50
Mid-term
AFR 4.82 4.76 4.73 4.71
110 percent AFR 5.31 5.24 5.21 5.18
120 percent AFR 5.79 5.71 5.67 5.64
Long-term
AFR 5.57 5.49 5.45 5.43
110 percent AFR 6.13 6.04 6.00 5.97
120 percent AFR 6.70 6.59 6.54 6.50
Rev. Rul. 2001-43, I.R.B. 2001-36.
WITHHOLDING TAXES. The taxpayer was a
professional baseball team which was required to pay back
wages under an employment settlement. The employees who
received the payments did not work for the team in the year
the back wages were paid. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, under Bowman v. United States, 824 F.2d
528 (6th Cir. 1987), the wages were taxable under the FICA
and FUTA rules in effect in the years the wages were earned,
not when they were paid. The Sixth Circuit case was
designated as not for publication. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the back wages were to be taxed under
FICA and FUTA tax rules in effect in the year the back
wages were paid and not when the wages were earned. The
final judgment was entered by the District Court pursuant to
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Cleveland Indians Baseball
Co. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,593 (D. Ohio 2001), on rem from, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,517 (6th Cir. 2001), on rem from, 2001-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,341 (S. Ct. 2001), rev’g 215 F.3d
1325 (6th Cir. 2000).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK . The plaintiffs were Nevada dairy producers who
s ld milk to California processors. The plaintiffs challenged
the California milk price stabilization program as violating
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court
h l  that the case was governed by the holding of Shamrock
Farms Co. v. Veneman, 146 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1998),
which held that the California program was immunized from
Commerce Clause challenges by Section 144 of the 1996
Farm Bill. The plaintiffs also alleged that the program
violated the Equal Protection Clause but the court held that
the issue was insufficiently pled because the petition failed
to allege facts to demonstrate that the classifications of
producers are arbitrary or that they are not rationally related
to legitimate state interests. Ponderosa Dairy v. Lyons, No.
99-16981 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2001).
ZONING
EXCLUSIVE FARM USE ZONE . A city owned land in
an exclusive farm use zone and sought permission to spread
pretreated waste effluent onto land to irrigate and fertilize
poplar trees which would eventually be sold. The plaintiff
was a neighboring land owner who challenged the proposed
use of the land as violating the use restrictions of the zoning
ordinance for an exclusive farm use zone. The plaintiff
argued, and the Land Use Board of Appeals agreed, that the
proposed use was a utility facility and required a finding that
the facility could not be operated on other land. The court
reviewed the legislative history of Or. Rev. Stat. §
215.283(1)(d) which defined a “utility facility” to mean
equipment or apparatus. The court held that, in this case, the
only equipment was the spraying equipment used to apply
the effluent to the ground. The actual treatment, if any, of the
effluent occurred through the natural absorbion of the
effluent by the ground and the tree roots. Because the
treatment was done by the ground and roots, there was no
quipment used in the treatment of the effluent and no utility
facility would exist on the land. The court held that the
prop sed use of the effluent was a farm use compatible with
th  exclusive farm use zoning. Cox v. Polk County, 25 P.3d
970 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
CITATION UPDATES
Estate of Burchell v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 382
(S.D. N.Y. 2001) (estate valuation), see p. 101 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
FEATURING DISCUSSION OF EGTRRA 2001   
    by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
October 2-5, 2001
Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four
days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On
Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and
ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of
agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which
will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional
charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Farm estate planning, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at the hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees   for current subscribers    (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the Agricultural
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345 (two days), $500
(three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    n subscribers   are $200, $385, $560 and $720, respectively.
Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 7 days prior to the seminar, so please call for
availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available online at www. grilawpress.com
For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
